This is a full text of the exclusive interview between strana.ru’s Rosa Tsvetkova and Russian Vice-Premier Ilya Klebanov, President Vladimir Putin’s appointed minister in charge of the entire Kursk salvage operation. They were talking at the beginning of November. Klebanov discusses all stages of the international mission, the role of Russian specialists and the Mammoet-Smit International contracting consortium from Holland, and the continuing inquiry into what sank the boat.

        Q: Now the operation has been carried out successfully, perhaps this is the time to recall the initial bewilderment around the choice of the company that became the general technical contractor – the Mammoet company. After all, you were taking a big chance by selecting that little-known Dutch firm for executing such a unique project as raising a sunken submarine from the seabed. Can you share with us your feelings and thoughts concerning the circumstances of making such a choice?

        A: As a matter of fact, we became acquainted with Mammoet almost immediately after we announced a tender for the Kursk salvage operation and made it clear that we would examine all projects. Actually, there were about 600 such projects submitted. When (Rubin submarine design bureau chief) Igor Spassky and I were examining them, the Mammoet proposal somehow immediately caught our attention. At that time, it was, of course, still only an idea, but even then, at the beginning of the year, it seemed to be very serious.

        It began to develop very rapidly and energetically with the help of our Russian specialists, first of all, from the Rubin Marine Engineering Design Bureau and the Krylov Research Institute. The basic calculations of that project were carried out along the entire technological line.

        But at that time, we were holding quite intensive talks with an international consortium. First of all, because the consortium had already participated in preliminary operations, in the stages of retrieving some of the bodies of the crewmen. Secondly, and this is quite important – something I do not want to conceal – the consortium was one of the initiators to found the International Kursk Charity Fund, whose main objective was to raise funds for the salvage operation.

        And the consortium at that point played its decisive role. That is when we began contractual talks with the people from the consortium. I would not like to elaborate now on the course of the talks with those well-known companies that had a lot of underwater working experience.

        But it turned out that towards the end of the talks, it suddenly became known that they were prepared to tackle the project only in 2002. For various reasons, this timeframe did not suit us, and it was then I decided to change companies. I would like to emphasise that this decision was all mine.

        Probably this involved a certain risk because Mammoet was not among the winners of the competition, although I must say that somewhere around mid-April of 2001, we nevertheless decided to include that company in the consortium.

        At our request, the experts from Mammoet began working on the project as one of the working operators. But when it became known that the consortium was not prepared for carrying out the operation, for various reasons – I shall not speak about those reasons, perhaps the consortium itself will speak about them at some time – a decision was made to change the company that would execute the project.

        Of course, there was a risk because it was our commitment to carry out the operation precisely this year. This was our commitment to everyone – the president, the relatives of the dead seamen and the country, in the final count.

        If we had taken the salvaging operation into the following year, this would have been a disappointing and terrible blow to the relatives that already knew about the president’s order and that work had already been started.

        To be honest, there were other reasons why we could not postpone the operation till 2002 because already, there were many people who had taken a negative attitude towards us. The situation with Mammoet theoretically allowed us to cope with the job already in 2001. And we took that chance. We took a real risk.

        And very swiftly, unlike all preceding negotiations, the contract was drawn up – in a matter of about 10 days: that, for contracts of such scope, was also a world record, I think. I explain this by the strong desire of both sides to accomplish this most unique operation. Then our specialists, together with their counterparts from Mammoet, began translating this idea into life, already in technical terms.

        We started working to coordinate all the technologies of the project – calculations and testing. A lot of hard work here was done by academicians Spassky, Pashin and their organisations. A tremendous amount of modeling work was done. A great number of the most complicated models were created. In short, it is possible to say that the technology of the future operation was honed to perfection in the shortest possible timeframe.

        Not a single, even the most seemingly insignificant nuance of the technology of the operation, went without modeling. Not a single one! And that is why during the actual lifting operation, on the whole, there was not a single mishap in any of the stages of the technological operation. Not in a single case!

        Q: But even so, were there moments during this truly unique operation when decisions had to be made instantaneously on the spot?

        A: There were several such moments. The first came up when it was decided to cut the technological “windows” (the holes into which the lifting cables were placed) at the very initial stage of the operation. But the most difficult moment was slicing off the first compartment. I have explained over and over again why the first compartment could not be raised together with the rest of the boat.

        Mammoet was absolutely right that it did not want to risk its personnel, and we too had no right to take such risks. The first compartment had to be cut off. Even today, it poses quite a serious threat in view of the sufficiently large number of non-detonated torpedoes in it, and even then, we did not have a clear picture of the situation. Without this, we could not take chances. And when the compartment was cut off, our specialists considered that it had not been sliced off completely. But the Dutch experts were certain that everything was normal.

        However, had we decided, God forbid, to repeat the cutting operation, we would have been set back a long way in terms of time. And that is why once again, at a very brief conference I held at naval headquarters - it was a video-conference with the participation of Northern Fleet commander Popov; the chief of the Special Mission Expedition Motsak; Admiral Kuroyedov (Russia’s naval commander-in-chief) and myself from the Russian side on board the Peter the Great battleship - that it was decided to go ahead with the operation. To be sure, we were taking a risk, but it paid off.

        Q: Didn’t the contract stipulate that Mammoet was responsible for all the technical decisions? How did it turn out that the final decision on each stage of the operation depended entirely on the Russian side?

        A: The technology was worked out by both sides. However, each subsequent step could begin only after an act was signed to confirm that the preceding stage had been completed. And each signature on such an act implied a great risk that only the Russian side could take upon itself. Take, for example, the job of cutting off the first compartment. I shall not dwell on the details at this moment, but in the final count, it turned out that our specialists were right. At the same time, we were right in that we decided to take that risk in going ahead, without repeating the severing operation.

        Q: At the beginning of this stage of the operation there were a lot of, let’s say, narrow-minded complaints about dragging it out in terms of time. Everyone was worried because the culminating moment (the actual raising of the Kursk) was coming at a time when the stormy period was setting in, when the weather was getting worse.

        A: I do not want to resort to such trivial phrases as “success is never blamed” but we could also feel the great pressure that was being put on us. You know when there is nothing to speak about, people begin talking about God knows what. For example, talk about the timeframe of the operation went so far as to almost interfere with our work. “They said that the lifting of the submarine was slated for tomorrow, but now they are postponing it once again and that means they are lying to us, that all is nothing but profanity, again they will not raise anything.

        Q: Then perhaps there was in general no reason to set certain deadlines? Remember when it was announced that the hoisting stage was to start on September 15?

        A: When we publicly signed that contract with Mammoet on May 18 of this year, we did not conceal such datum marks for the entire operation. What we said was this: If everything proceeds normally, then according to the technology that we had worked out together, the actual process of hoisting the submarine should start September 15. We did not make that deadline for objective reasons. Look how things have turned out. Today, for some reason, all of a sudden those experts (of which there were throngs) are keeping mum, and even the media were vying for such a role at one time.

        What advantages did such “pundits” have? The advantage they had was this: They took no risks whatsoever, and they could say anything they wanted. After all, they bore no responsibility whatsoever. For example, the highly-respected Rear-Admiral Yury Senatsky, who never tired of “prophesying” that “they will do nothing, they will not achieve anything, that it was a reckless venture” – all of a sudden announced a few days ago: “It was a brilliant operation, simply superb, nothing of the like has ever been done before… but that they were very lucky with the weather.”

        Do you understand what is going on? According to him, it turns out that only the weather played its role in the operation. Now when those “pundits” at the sidelines no longer have anything to say, they are trying to find any negative aspect so as to say something new. That is why it is better not to step into such polemic bantering. It is better to do that which we were doing – to raise the submarine, and then everyone would stop gabbing. And that’s all!

        Q: The tragedy with the Kursk has somewhat underscored the problem concerning a federal rescue service that should exist and be ready to act at all times for emergency situations at such levels. It is understandable that the state cannot afford to establish such a permanent operational rescue service. Do you see any economic solution to this problem?

        A: Of course, during the past decade, the rescue service of the Russian Navy, and not only the navy, has sustained serious losses, very serious losses. But I want to stress that this does not concern the Kursk accident. All the means and facilities that were theoretically needed for rescuing the crew were on hand, and were fully activated in that operation. Everything that had been programmed according to standard regulations, everything that had been designed for rescuing crews from submarines as the Kursk, everything that the navy had, everything in working order.

        Nonetheless, it must be said that Russia’s rescue services sustained serious losses, first of all, technical losses. On the president’s instructions, we have done quite a lot of work on this already, and now it is in the process of being formulated into a very serious document for organising a rescue system at sea. I would like to emphasise that what we are talking about here is a “system” rather than a “service.”

        The essence of that system lies in the following: If a naval ship is in distress, the rescue operation is to be spearheaded by the navy’s rescue service. If a merchant vessel is in distress, the rescue operation is to be headed by the transport ministry’s rescue service. And after that, everything must proceed strictly according to instructions and orders – the navy, the transport ministry, the fisheries committee, the Federal Border Service, the Emergency Situations Ministry, all that are in some way related to this problem and have the means and facilities for conducting rescue operations. In principle, the document is ready and is being currently analysed by experts. In addition, work is being done on a bill, which many countries have, that enables mobilisation of all resources, including on the paid basis and those of the commercial entities, in an event of this sort of situation.

        Q.: I still cannot help asking this question. Public opinion somehow got into a mood for seeing your latest visit to Severomorsk, where the government commission held its last meeting, result in the announcement of one of the main versions of the loss of Kursk. The expectation was, in many respects, explained by the fact that a lot of things, including the recorders, all falling into the category of material evidence, were found inside the submarine. Consequently, in some way or other, they should have explained what had happened aboard Kursk during the explosions. But this failed to come about. Why?

        A.: The government commission investigating the causes of the loss of Kursk is under very serious pressure, under the burden of its commitments to tell the whole of this country what happened. If, let us assume, we had determined that clearly today, believe me, I would have told you then and there. Unfortunately, I cannot say it now for objective reasons, even though we have documented and recorded everything we have raised from the submarine. It cannot be ruled out that we will come to the answer about what happened in the process of study of all that material even before we start on the first compartment. But it can also be that all of that will not lead to the discovery of the causes. At any rate, there is no answer today.

        Q.: But does it help to clear the situation when you know from where, and in what attitude, the bodies of the dead, personal effects and documents are raised?

        A.: I will say the banal thing again: We have simulated the entire course of the disaster so thoroughly that we see absolutely nothing new inside the submarine now. All that we see inside the submarine today was simulated and calculated as early as last year. Absolutely precisely, up to one millimetre. But some things connected with the submarine’s hull we have seen today. We will try to answer what they are about. Maybe a collision, maybe the consequences of the explosion. I must say again that we will take the path of very complicated calculations, which we know how to do, to try to find out.

        ends